Maritime Law - Maritime Transport - Shipbuilding-Geopolitics - Industrial Sovereignty:Why Was the Largest French-Flagged Container Ship Built in China?

By Jean-Désiré Groguhé Ph.D

CMA CGM Notre Dame

On July 2, 2026, the Port of Le Havre hosted a landmark event with the official inauguration of CMA CGM Notre Dame, the largest container ship sailing under French flag and first of a series of ten ultra-large container vessels exceeding 24,000 TEU ordered by French shipping company CMA CGM. Powered by Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)1*, and equipped with the latest technological innovations, this impressive vessel symbolizes both modernization of French merchant fleet and maritime industry’s energy transition.

Yet behind this industrial achievement lies an apparent paradox worthy of closer examination. Although this flagship of the French merchant fleet proudly flies the French flag, it was neither built in France nor in any European shipyard. Instead, it was constructed in China, by Jiangsu Yangzi Xinfu Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., located in Jiangsu Province.2*

An Apparent Paradox

At first glance, this situation may seem surprising. France has a long and prestigious shipbuilding tradition. Chantiers de l’Atlantique, located in Saint-Nazaire, ranks among world’s largest and most technologically advanced shipyards. It has built, and continues to build, some of the largest cruise ships ever constructed, major surface naval vessels and offshore structures for offshore wind industry. French expertise in highly sophisticated ships construction is internationally recognized.3*

Nevertheless, France’s leading shipping company chose to have its largest container ships built in China before registering them under the French flag. This raises a fundamental question:

How can France’s leading shipping company decide to build the flagship of its fleet in China when France possesses one of the world’s most respected shipbuilding industries? Is this decision purely driven by economic considerations, or does it reflect a profound transformation of the global shipbuilding industry?

China Now Dominates Global Shipbuilding

Over the past two decades, the building of ultra-large container ships has become overwhelmingly concentrated in Asia, particularly in China and South Korea. In recent years, China has established itself as the world’s leading shipbuilder through an ambitious industrial policy supported by massive public investment. According to several OECD studies, China’s shipbuilding industry benefits from substantial government support through subsidies, preferential financing, public guarantees, state orders and targeted industrial policies. These mechanisms are widely recognized as major factors behind the rapid expansion of Chinese shipyards in the global market.4* China also benefits from a fully integrated shipbuilding supply chain, abundant skilled labour and comparatively lower production costs. As a result, Chinese shipyards can build dozens of container ships simultaneously while maintaining highly competitive delivery schedules. Simply put, China builds faster, in greater numbers and at lower cost than any of its competitors. Today, China accounts for more than half of the world’s merchant ship production by gross tonnage. 5*

Unlike China, European Union Member States are subject to strict EU competition rules that significantly limit the financial support governments may provide to domestic shipyards. For example, if French government wished to grant substantial financial aid to Chantiers de l’Atlantique to enable it to offer prices below those of a Chinese shipyard for a series of container ships, such aid would have to be notified to the European Commission, which could prohibit it if considered incompatible with the internal market or likely to distort competition among European shipbuilders.6* By contrast, major Chinese shipbuilding groups, particularly those operating under China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), benefit from an institutional environment in which public authorities enjoy much broader discretion to support the national shipbuilding industry financially.7*

This difference in legal and regulatory frameworks has a considerable impact on international competitiveness.

Above All, an Economic Decision

For a shipping company, ordering a fleet of ten ultra-large container ships represents an investment worth several billion dollars. Purchase price therefore becomes a decisive factor. For comparable quality, Asian shipyards generally offer lower construction costs, shorter delivery times and greater industrial capacity. Given the realities of fierce global competition, it is difficult for any shipowner to ignore these competitive advantages. CMA CGM’s decision therefore appears primarily to reflect an economic assessment driven by international competitiveness rather than by considerations of national industrial preference.

A Ship’s Flag Is Not Its Shipyard

Under international maritime law, a ship’s flag determines its nationality, legal system applicable on board, labour regulations, administrative obligations and the competent authority responsible for exercising jurisdiction and regulatory oversight. It establishes the legal relationship between the vessel and the State whose flag it flies, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The flag State is responsible, among other things, for ensuring vessel’s safety, enforcing international maritime conventions, supervising seafarers’ working conditions and issuing statutory certificates.

Conversely, the location where a ship is built has no legal effect whatsoever on its nationality or legal status. A vessel built in China may therefore be fully subject to French jurisdiction provided it is registered in the French registry and flies the French flag. CMA CGM Notre Dame perfectly illustrates this legal principle. In other words, shipbuilding is fundamentally an industrial and economic decision, whereas the choice of flag is primarily governed by legal, regulatory, fiscal, social and strategic considerations.

These two concepts are legally independent, even though they jointly determine how a ship operates internationally.

A Question of Industrial Sovereignty

Beyond economic considerations, this situation raises broader questions regarding French, and more generally European, industrial policy. Europe legitimately seeks to strengthen its economic sovereignty. Yet when it comes to building its largest merchant vessels, European shipowners overwhelmingly turn to Asian shipyards. This reveals a significant industrial dependence in a sector that remains essential to international trade. The issue is not a lack of technological expertise. French and European shipbuilding know-how unquestionably exists. Rather, the challenge lies in economic competitiveness, production costs, available industrial capacity and, above all, public policies supporting the shipbuilding industry.

The Real Issue

CMA CGM Notre Dame story extends far beyond delivery of France’s largest container ship. The real debate is therefore not whether CMA CGM made the right industrial decision. As a private company operating in an intensely competitive global market, it must remain economically competitive and respond to commercial realities of its industry.

The real question is of a different nature:

Can a major maritime power sustainably preserve its strategic autonomy when the construction of its most important commercial vessels depends primarily on foreign industrial capabilities? Does Europe still intend to maintain an industrial base capable of designing and building the ships that carry its international trade, or is it prepared to delegate this strategic capability permanently to other global powers?

Behind CMA CGM Notre Dame therefore lies a much broader issue extending well beyond maritime transport itself: industrial sovereignty, supply chain resilience and the preservation of strategic industrial expertise. While globalization undoubtedly enables companies to optimize costs, industrial sovereignty reminds us that maintaining national and European capabilities in strategically important industries remains equally essential. Ultimately, in maritime transport as in many other strategic sectors, economic competitiveness cannot sustainably replace a genuine industrial sovereignty policy.

Reconciling these two imperatives will undoubtedly constitute one of the major challenges facing maritime powers throughout the twenty-first century.

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1* LNG = Liquefied Natural Gas. LNG enables compliance with the environmental requirements established by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

2* Bureau Veritas. Classing CMA CGM’s First 24,000 TEU LNG Dual-Fuel Mega Container Ship. June 21, 2026.

3* Wikipédia. Chantiers de l’Atlantique. Aircraft carriers (Foch, 1960); Océan liners (Impératrice Eugénie, 1864 ; Normandie, 1932 ; France, 1960 ; Queen Mary 2, 2003) ; Ferries (Danielle Casanova, 1989 ; Napoléon Bonaparte, 1996), etc.

4* OECD. Report on China’s Shipbuilding and the Policies Affecting It. April 8, 2021.OECD. State-Owned Enterprises in the Shipbuilding Sector. February 2, 2021.

5* United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). March 27, 2026. In 2024, China accounted for nearly 55% of global merchant ship production measured in Gross Tonnage (GT), making it by far the world’s leading shipbuilding nation.

6* Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Articles 107 and 108.

7* Wikipedia. China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC).

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